

STATEMENT BY

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UNITED STATES ARMY

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Introduction

Chairman Bayh, Ranking Member Burr, distinguished Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to provide a status on the Readiness of United States Army forces with respect to deployed, deploying and non-deployed units and the Army's ability to provide forces to meet combatant commanders' requirements and respond to unforeseen contingencies.

On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John M. McHugh and our Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr., I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your continued, strong support and demonstrated commitment to our Soldiers, Army Civilians, and Family Members.

As all of you know, it has been a busy time for our Nation's military. We have been at war for the past eight-plus years. With the support of Congress, our forces deployed are the very best manned, equipped, trained and led in the 234-year history of the United States Army. That said, this success has come at the expense of our non-deployed and Generating Forces. The consequence is increased strategic risk to the Nation.

The prolonged demand and high operational tempo of this two-front war have undeniably put a strain on the readiness of our Force. Our

current readiness is a reflection of the total number of available Soldiers, as well as materiel resources – coupled with time to train. This sum measure of readiness is further impacted by the overall global demand for Army forces.

So long as demand exceeds supply, the availability and deployability of Soldiers, units and equipment will be challenged, as will the Army's ability to build trained and ready forces. In particular, heightened, prolonged demand results in periods of degraded readiness for non-deployed forces in order to shift Soldiers and equipment to units preparing to deploy.

The Army currently has limited capacity to respond to unforeseen contingencies. However, if demand for Army forces comes down as forecasted and budgetary expectations remain consistent, then we should be able to restore our full operational depth by FY12.

Recognizing this process will be dependent upon a number of factors to include the projected drawdown of forces in Iraq; the continued implementation of the rotational Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model; and, the continued transition of our Reserve Component (RC) force from a strategic reserve to an operational force, thus allowing the Army recurrent, assured, predictable access to the RC to meet operational requirements IAW ARFORGEN. By FY13, these actions, in part, and the resulting increase in operational depth should enable our Army to mitigate current strategic risk and reliably respond to the full range of potential, unforeseen contingencies.

In the meantime, I assure the members of this subcommittee, the Army is doing everything within its control to improve our readiness and

restore balance to the Force. Congress remains a vital partner in this shared endeavor.

Our plan to restore balance to the Force

The United States Army remains focused on the four imperatives of our plan to restore balance to the Force: our ability to **sustain** the Army's Soldiers, Civilians and Families; **prepare** forces for success in the current conflict; **reset** returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies; and **transform** to meet the demands of the 21st century.

Sustain our All-Volunteer Force

Sustaining our All-Volunteer Force is our first imperative. The Soldier, as Secretary Gates has said, is our greatest strategic asset. Unfortunately, after eight-plus years of war, we continue to see the high OPTEMPO and prolonged stress and strain on our Force manifested in the increased demand for behavioral health counseling and drug and alcohol counseling; increased divorce rates; and increased numbers of Soldiers temporarily non-deployable from nagging injuries from previous deployments.

The Army remains focused on providing vital Family programs and services to include welfare and recreation; youth services and child care; Survivor Outreach Services; mental and behavioral health services; and expanded counseling and rehabilitative opportunities for Soldiers and Family Members.

In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, the Army began a 5-year, \$50 million seminal study into suicide prevention that will help inform the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention (ACPHP). The Army also began

instituting our Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program, an all-inclusive approach that puts mental health on par with physical fitness. By promoting resiliency and life-coping skills, we hope to help our Soldiers, Civilians, and Family Members to better deal with stress and other challenges. By enhancing the quality of life across our Army community, we believe we will see improvement in many other areas of concern, including suicides.

Prepare Forces for Success

The centerpiece of our plan to continue to restore balance to our Force is the maturation of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. This model represents the core process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a sustained and rotational basis – to meet current and future strategic demands.

The ARFORGEN process includes three force pools—Reset, Train-Ready, and Available. This process increases predictability for Soldiers, Families, employers, and communities. ARFORGEN enables our Reserve Component to remain an integral element of the operational force while providing the Nation with strategic depth (i.e., those non-deployed units which are two to three years from commitment) and operational flexibility to meet unexpected contingencies.

Manning

The Army is currently implementing the Active Army temporary end-strength increase of up to 22,000 Soldiers approved by the Secretary of Defense in July 2009.

More than eight years of sustained combat operations, coupled with taking the Army off of stop-loss, have increased non-deployable rates in our units. These increasing non-deployable rates (from 9.92% in FY07 to

12% in FY09) require us to continue to overfill our deploying units. The Soldiers needed to overfill those deploying units come largely from both non-deployed and Generating Force units. The resulting reductions in personnel hamper the affected units' ability to train which ultimately impacts the units' overall readiness.

The decision was made to temporarily increase the Army end-strength by 15,000 Soldiers by end of fiscal year 2010. This increase assisted in offsetting the decline in available personnel in our Army units. We added 5,000 Soldiers in FY09, and will add an additional 10,000 in FY10. The resulting temporary Army end-strength will be 562,400 Soldiers.

The Army is still assessing the need for the additional 7,000 Soldier growth for FY11. This would bring us to the total 22,000 end-strength increase. The decision on whether or not to add the additional 7,000 personnel is pending confirmation of our immediate demand, the pace of the drawdown from Iraq, and the requirement for forces in Afghanistan.

If the decision is made to add the additional 7,000 Soldiers, growth could be complete by end of 2nd quarter, FY11. We would hold at that end-strength for the requisite 12 months before beginning the 18-month drawdown. Regardless of the decision on the 7,000 Soldier growth, we plan to return to the pre-increase end-strength level of 547,400 by the end of FY13.

Reset Equipment

Equipment Reset is an essential element of readiness and restoring balance to the Army for known and future requirements. Reset is a necessary process that must continue not only as long as we have forces

deployed, but an additional two to three years after major deployments end to ensure future equipment readiness.

Reset is especially challenging given the extraordinary wear on vehicles, aircraft, and equipment in the harsh environments our forces operate in today. Coarse sand, fine dust, extreme temperatures, and high OPTEMPO erode sophisticated mechanical and electronic systems at altitudes and loads which near the edge of the aircraft design capabilities. Our rotary wing fleet, for example, operates up to six times non-combat usage levels.

Reset timelines are directly related to the pace of the Iraq drawdown, operational decisions such as the OEF plus-up, available capacity within our industrial base (physical plant capacities, labor and long lead-time parts) and the availability and timing of funding. Over the past year, our depot-level Maintenance Reset workload exceeded ~100,000 items of equipment; and, we expect to sustain this pace for as long as we have substantial forces deployed. In FY10, the Army plans to complete the equipment Reset 27 Brigades (25 maneuver and 2 enabling brigades), as well as numerous below Brigade-level units.

Given current projections, we would expect our requirements to decrease in the out-years as we complete the retrograde and Reset of equipment from Iraq. That said, Reset activities alone cannot improve Army Readiness in the near- or mid-term. Repairs, recapitalization, or replacement of battle losses experienced in combat does not fix on-hand equipment shortfalls that existed prior to a unit's deployment. However, equipment Reset does ensure our on-hand equipment is maintained at a high state of readiness to prepare units for future combat operations.

Readiness Reporting

The Army has made progress towards implementing and advancing readiness reporting policy and technology in 2009. Our current readiness reporting system has considerably improved the accurate, reliable measurement of units at the tactical and operational level.

However, significant challenges do still remain. The fast pace of this war, coupled with the rapidly evolving demand for new and improved capabilities means our requirements are constantly shifting and equipment is continually on the move. Our long-standing unit readiness reporting process was not designed to nor is it capable of keeping up with or capturing the full 'velocity' or magnitude of activity in our current operating environments. Our long-standing readiness reporting process has been adapted to support the ARFORGEN model and the Army's new modular force structure.

We are making progress towards improving and expanding this process. For example, the Army expanded the former Percent Effective (PCTEF) reporting to include manning and equipping levels for assigned missions. This new rating called the A-Level incorporates assigned mission manning and equipping ratings to better support Commanders in their assessments of assigned mission capabilities. These are reported no later than 270 days prior to deployment or even earlier if the command or component directs it.

These and other changes to the Army's overall readiness reporting process represent significant improvements, but challenges still remain. We must continue to make necessary adjustments and educate the Force accordingly.

Army Prepositioned Stocks

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) continue—most recently in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—to fulfill their primary purpose of enhancing the Army's strategic agility. We have pulled equipment from and rebuilt APS several times over the past eight-plus years. Most recently, we used equipment from APS-3 and APS-5 to support both the surge in Iraq and the ongoing plus-up in Afghanistan.

In order to restore operational flexibility and reduce strategic risk, it is necessary that we continue to try to reconstitute APS, and indeed, all our war reserve stocks. We have a strategy in place and will continue to make appropriate budget requests to restore our APS to full capability by 2015.

Transforming our Force

The Army is evolving our capabilities to meet current and future strategic demands. We recognize that we must ensure our Nation has the capability and range of military options to meet the challenges we face in the 21st century. As Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, Jr. has stated, *"We need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies – at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force."*

The centerpiece of our efforts is the shift to a modular construct focused at the brigade level, thus creating a more deployable, adaptable, and versatile force. This ongoing transformation has greatly enhanced the Army's ability to respond to any situation, quickly and effectively. However, the degree of impact continues to vary, for example, between

Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), “enablers,” the Reserve components, and individual Soldiers.

Strategic Risk

Our Army remains a resilient, professional force dedicated to defending the homeland and defeating our Nation’s enemies. However, eight-plus years of war continue to strain our Soldiers, Civilians, Families, equipment and infrastructure. We made considerable progress over the last year in mitigating the negative effects of consistently high demand for forces; nonetheless, high deployment-to-dwell ratios for Army units and individuals continue to stress the All-Volunteer Force, and challenge the Army’s ability to respond to unexpected contingencies. Strategic risk has been identified in the following areas:

Sustained Demand

Since September 11, 2001, all deploying Army units are trained, led, and equipped to achieve the highest readiness standards prior to deployment. However, due to sustained demand, Army units are achieving this deployment readiness closer and closer to their arrival dates in theater. This creates operational risk by reducing the near-term flexibility for adapting to mission-driven adjustments to arrival dates or other requirements.

Limited Dwell Time

Prolonged, heightened demand for Army forces continues to limit availability of unit and individual dwell time. As a result, Soldiers often have minimal time to train, rest and recuperate prior to their next deployment. This also restricts the Geographic Combatant Commander’s operational flexibility for altering unit arrival dates or shifting Areas of Responsibility.

Projected increases to unit and individual dwell times depend on a number of factors to include: absence of any significant new missions; Iraq drawdown will proceed on time and year-end end-strength in Iraq will be less than 50,000 personnel; we will maintain continued access to RC forces; and, Afghanistan surge will proceed on time and not increase beyond the planned level.

Limited Resources

Army and Defense resources are set within national affordability parameters, yet demand is unconstrained. Over time, the Army (in complete transparency with OSD, the Joint Staff, and combatant commanders) has directed resources away from non-deployed Operational Forces and our Generating Force to support our forces deployed. The result is increased strategic risk in the Army's ability to respond to unforeseen contingencies.

Unfunded Readiness Priorities

While the Army does not have any unfunded requirements, as with any budget request, there are areas where additional resources could enhance existing programs. The continuous assessment of lessons learned provides us with new information on possible items that, if accelerated, would provide added value to Commanders in the field.

Unknown Risk

We recognize that much of the risk we assume depends on minimal projected reductions in demand and corresponding savings; and the absence of unplanned events or a resurgence of tensions in 'hot spots' around the world. If such unforeseen events occur, we will have to make the necessary adjustments, to include reallocation of resources.

However, based on the current situation and known risks, we are confident the FY11 budget request, if appropriated in full, would improve the overall readiness of our Force by ensuring the Army is able to properly care for, train, equip and support our Soldiers, Civilians, and Family Members around the world.

Conclusion

These continue to be challenging times for our Nation and for our military. With the support of Congress, we have deployed the best manned, equipped, trained, and led forces in the history of the United States Army over the past eight-plus years. However, the fact remains that we have asked a great deal from our Soldiers, Civilians, and their Families.

Looking ahead, the Army must continue to sustain our All-Volunteer Army, modernize, adapt our institutions, and transform our Force. We must ensure we have a trained and ready Force that is well-prepared, expeditionary, versatile, lethal, sustainable, and able to adapt to any situation.

I assure the members of this Subcommittee – the Army's senior leaders are focused and working hard to address these challenges and to determine the needs of the Force for the future.

Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I thank you again for your continued and generous support of the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and their Families. I look forward to your questions.